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Abstract: 
 
“The end of the South African commercial farmer” is often proclaimed, mainly as a 
result of land reform and the lack of encouraging agricultural policy measures. This 
paper draws attention to a similar tendency, not related to South Africa's positive 
actions, however, but to a profound agrarian restructuring related to new agricultural 
investment models. These models, promoted by macro-actors such as banking 
corporations, investment funds, asset management companies and agricultural 
engineering companies, often foreign to the agricultural sector, integrate the primary 
agricultural production within well-connected, totally integrated, finance-value-chains. 
In these models, macro-actors oversee, control and own the entire process (supply of 
inputs, monitoring of the harvest, hedge and sale of the production) whereas independent 
farmers become ‘service-providers’ of these institutions, as they do not possess their 
harvest, nor do they engage in decision-making and in several cases do not even own the 
land. The paper describes and analyses the different agricultural production models 
being developed in the South African context and discusses their application and 
implications for the country’s agricultural development trajectories. As such, it poses 
significant questions regarding the “financiarisation and corporisation” of the 
agricultural sector, the concentration process on-going in the sector, the regulation of 
the sector by often foreign controlled non-agricultural entities and, probably most 
importantly, the status of the independent farmer in South Africa. 
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1. Beyond land: the renewed interest in agricultural production 
 
The past few years have been characterised by a "rediscovery" of agriculture as a sector 
for strategic activity. Until then, agriculture had been gradually relegated both in the 
public policy agenda, for whom the myths of an essentially urban growth and provision 
of agricultural produce at moderate cost contributed to the chronic indifference, as well as 
in private investors’ strategies who were discouraged by the low financial margins and 
the risks inherent to this activity (OECD, 2010). 
 
In 2008, the food price crisis led to a renewed interest in agriculture on the part of these 
actors. On one hand, the national and international authorities recognised the urgency of 
the agricultural situation in developing countries. Although commitments have often not 
 realised (OCDE, 2009), significant progress has been made. As such, since 2008, in the 
framework of the Maputo agreement, eight countries are contributing at least ten percent 
of their national budget to agriculture (compared to only four between 2004 and 2008); 
30 countries have ratified their CAADP national compacts; and the African Union (AU) 
was pro-active in signing the AU Land Policy. Also, in 2009, at Aquila, US$20 billion 
were promised by the G8 members for the fight against hunger, particularly through a 
focus on agricultural development (OXFAM, 2010). On the other hand, this crisis has 
resulted in an awakening of the private sector. The structural evolution and projections 
regarding the agricultural sector (population growth, pressure on natural resources, 
dietary changes and energy and environmental tendencies), coupled to the food price 
crisis of 2008 are questioning the myth of the permanent low cost of food commodities 
and are pushing investors towards agricultural activities (Anseeuw et al., 2012). 
Perceptions have changed: henceforth, this sector presents interesting financial returns 
from an investment perspective. The financial crisis of 2009 strengthened this dynamic. 
Confronted with uncertainties affecting financial assets (in particular those of the 
American treasury), investors view henceforth the farming sector as a safe refuge. 
 
As such, a multiplication of investment projects and increased foreign direct investments 
(FDI) into agriculture on the African continent has been observed. In 2008, FDI into the 
African continent reached US$87,6 billion (i.e. 27 % higher than the previous year), of 
which a third (i.e. US$27 billion) has been directed towards the mining and agricultural 
industries in Sub-Saharan African countries (UNCTAD, 2009). 
 
Regarding the nature of these investments, two categories can be distinguished. In the 
first instance, there are those aimed directly at natural resources, particularly land. This 
category, often referred to as “large-scale land investments”, is characterised by 
investors, public or private, national or foreign, acquiring land for agricultural and 
ecosystemic purposes, with investors endeavoring to develop their activities along the 
production chain, in particular focusing on primary production activities. This 
phenomenon is presently the object of extensive scientific analyses (Cotula et al., 2009; 
World Bank, 2010; Anseeuw et al., 2012b; Boche et al., 2012; etc.). According to Cotula 
and Vermeulen (2009), a reversal of the risk/profit relationship appears within the 
production chain: Whereas primary production constituted until now the main risk factor, 
with profits returning to downstream and particularly upstream actors, the increase in 
agricultural prices now tends to invert this relationship. 
 
However, it seems that this phenomenon represents only the tip of the iceberg in terms of 
wider land-related and agrarian dynamics. Indeed, the land acquisition phenomenon tends 
to divert attention from the dynamics of renewal of agricultural investment dynamics into 
agriculture and land-based activities (without necessarily acquiring the land, although – 
as will be detailed – direct land acquisition might still occur) (Ducastel and Anseeuw, 
2011). These dynamics are characterized by certain dominant actors controlling the 
various segments of the value-chain, through contractual arrangements but more 
particularly through vertical integration and direct investments. Although similar 
processes have been described in Latin America in the banana subsector for example 
(Neveu, 2001; Rabobank, 2012), the motivations of the actors, the sectoral origins of the 
 investors and the geographical areas concerned, make it a peculiar trend particularly for 
South Africa and the African continent (Ducastel and Anseeuw, 2011). Although less 
visible than the direct large-scale land acquisitions, these new models are developing 
rapidly and are illustrative of far-reaching and profound agrarian transformations, with 
significant consequences for farmers and traditional land owners and users. 
 
In order to better understand these restructurings, this article details several new 
production and investment models developed in South Africa. While this country 
distinguishes itself by specific land and rural structures, related to the previous era’s 
legacy, it seems to pioneer the previously mentioned dynamics. Indeed, increased 
liberalisation and deregulation of its economy and agricultural sector (Vink and Kirsten, 
2000) and the presence of several well-structured instruments, in particular the futures 
market for agricultural commodities (SAFEX) as well as a range of risk management 
instruments to investors1, present a convenient base for financial innovations. The 
countries’ land resources and its role as a regional power also stimulate the interest of 
investors in this market. As such, South Africa, as laboratory of new agricultural and 
investment practices, constitutes a valuable case-study for illustrating the current 
international dynamics. 
 
Section two of this paper presents the vector through which the current agricultural 
production and financial restructurings are taking place. The third section is dedicated to 
a detailed presentations and analysis of these new production and investment models, 
specific - at the moment - to South Africa. Before concluding, the paper provides in 
section four several reflections on the structural changes affecting agricultural economies 
and societies. 
 
2. Financing agriculture and the process of vertical integration of the production 
 
Discussions have been on-going on how to finance agriculture (Neveu, 2001). Besides 
more traditional agricultural financing, new instruments have been developed, such as 
contract farming and finance value-chains. These instruments "structure investments 
which are proposed throughout the value-chain. The financial services are often 
combined with marketing activities and possibly technical support" (Devèze, 2008). The 
latter is characterized by a system of contracts between agribusinesses or processors and 
large and small farmers, on the basis of which producers supply the company with a 
certain product. The integrating firm provides the farmer with the necessary labor and 
raw-material resources, consultation, etc. 
 
The renewed interest into agriculture, however, goes along with a more advanced form of 
vertical integration, through the integration of the primary production. This increasing 
control over land-based productive cycles, primary agricultural production in particular, 
is established through a strengthened vertical integration (Swinnen and Maertens, 2007). 
Downstream (including financing) and upstream activities (processing and distribution) 
are undergoing an ever-increasing integration process, led by macro-actors. In 
comparison to partnerships, contractualisation etc. (which represent an externalisation 
                                                 
1  But also private norms, rules and instruments. 
 process), integration of these activities (representing an internalisation process) allows 
dominant actors to widen their control over the productive cycle in its entirety 
(Williamson, 1985; Reardon et al., 2009).  
 
Through advanced vertical integration companies completely control production and 
establish not only a supply quota and the prices for agricultural production but also the 
size of that production and its technological level. As such, vertical integration is defined 
as the ownership of the production or the ownership of a production unit that previously 
had purchased the output. The act of ownership internalizes the exchange process (in 
oppostion to the use of the external market to obtain an input or to exchange an output 
which may have been through the use of contract or a sport market). The failure of the 
external market creates profit and risk incentives for the firm to integrate vertically 
(Kilmer, 1986). 
 
This integration process encompasses not only the farm itself, but also the entire chain of 
agriculture-related business, including seed supply, agrochemicals, processing, 
machinery, storage transport, marketing, … (Figure 1). The approach is not new, and 
several agricultural export sub-sectors (such as coffee, cotton, etc.) are already structured 
according to this model, particularly in Latin America (Rabobank, 2012). However, over 
the past few years, this financial strategy has been applied more widely, both 
geographically and at the level of the concerned value-chains (e.g. cereal). 
 
 
Figure 1: The finance value-chain and the advanced integration of value-chains 
 
This evolution must be seen in the context of the increased cost of inputs relative to land 
values. In general, the latter is not sufficient as collateral to cover the farmers’ expenses. 
As such, these micro-actors cover the necessary funds, in exchange for the rights over 
their future harvest. The financing of agriculture takes than the form of direct investment. 
 
3. New models of agricultural financing and production 
 
While the first common characteristic is the total integration of the different segments of 
the agricultural sector, the second is the interest of new types of actors in primary 
production. Although instances of down and upstream integration by monopolistic 
 agribusinesses are well-known (cf Cargill, Monsanto, etc.), the present integration 
processes (which includes the agricultural production), are presently being initiated from 
outside the agricultural sector, in particular by financial actors and engineering 
companies. 
 
Models vary according to the established organisation (contracts, part or full integration, 
etc.) and the actors involved (banks, intermediaries, investment funds, etc.). Without 
claiming to be exhaustive, three models are detailed in this article: bank integration, 
engineering companies and asset management companies, and investment funds2. 
 
* Bank integration within agricultural value-chains 
Banks are traditional partners within the agricultural and agro-industrial sectors, which 
they finance through a “classic” form characterised by a loan granted and secured 
through collateral, generally land. Presently, however, in the context of greater prospects 
for financial returns, banks tend to strengthen their control and their participation along 
the agricultural value-chains, including in primary agricultural production. This banking 
integration is essentially established through the integration and contractualisation of the 
various parties, in particular the producers (Figure 2). Concerning their relationships with 
the production side, a new production and risk management strategy is occurring.  
 
Firstly, the bank supplies the necessary liquidities in exchange for the rights over the 
future harvest: Instead of using the land as collateral, the agricultural production is traded 
and the ownership thereof is transferred to the bank. The farmer has in effect lost 
ownership over his/her production. 
 
This evolution must be seen in the context of the increased cost of inputs relative to land 
values. In general, the latter is not sufficient as collateral to cover the farmers’ expenses. 
This contract is negotiated between both parties at the beginning of the productive cycle, 
in other words, even before seeds are sown. The contract stipulates the type, the volume 
and the quality of the production, defined according to farm characteristics (size, soil 
quality, etc.) and previous production patterns of the farm. The purchase price is 
calculated according to market projections. The producer thus has a fixed income defined 
in advance. In the event of a surplus or shortfall in the agreed upon volume and quality, 
the farmer is credited or debited to the corresponding amount. As such, the risk of 
production is transformed into performance risk, which is entirely born by the farmer. 
 
At the same time, the bank covers itself against production and production risks. On one 
hand, a multi-risk insurance, facilitated by the bank, ensures the production against all 
natural risks inherent to the agricultural activity (flood, fire, etc.) but also against side-
selling, theft, etc. In addition, since the bank contracts several geographically dispersed 
farmers, it contributes to production risks limitations and it benefits from important 
economies of scale with insurance companies. On the other hand, the bank also limits the 
risks associated with price fluctuations. Indeed, it takes care of the commercialisation 
                                                 
2 For more detailed descriptions of these models, See Ducastel, A. (2010). La restructuration du secteur 
agricole en Afrique du sud. Paris, Université Paris I - La Sorbonne, CIAHPD, Mémoire de Master 2, 91p. 
 management and price coverage through hedging on futures markets (i.e. mainly 
SAFEX’s futures market in the case of South African). The latter can be done before the 
bank effectively decides to engage in the primary production cycle. 
 
During the productive cycle, the bank and the insurance company monitor the production 
(mainly through agricultural engineers employed by the banks, but also through the use 
of satellite imagery). At the end of the harvest, the farmer delivers the production to a 
SAFEX certified silo, which guarantees the ownership of a certain volume at a specific 
quality to the bank. Commercialisation, which is undertaken by the bank, is organised 
mainly through the financial market, SAFEX. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Direct bank integration into agricultural value-chains 
Source: Ducastel (2010). 
 
Compared to contract farming models, this more integrated approach transfers all 
decision-making processes to the bank. The latter not only provides finance and 
insurance, it also controls the commercial aspects through hedging as well as input 
 provision and technical aspects via service delivery integration. In more extreme cases, 
certain banks have even acquired the land directly. 
 
It is estimated that around 30% to 40 % of South Africa’s annual cereal production is 
controlled through the framework of these models. Indeed, the three main commercial 
banks engaged in such models (ABSA, Standard Chartered and RMB) each declare 
controlling approximately 13 % of the production (rarely more in order to limit risk). 
These banks presently diversify their agricultural activities towards horticulture, animal 
production and other agricultural sub-sectors. 
 
* The agricultural engineering and asset management company model 
 
Sector integration can also take place through (financial or technical) intermediaries, 
mainly agricultural engineering companies and asset management companies. The aim of 
these companies is to centralise all the farmer-oriented services (input supply, technical 
support, commercialisation, etc.) within the very same entity. 
 
In this case, there is either acquisition of land or, at least, full transfer of the right of use 
of the land. In both cases, the engineering or management company employs a farm 
manager, which can be the (previous – in the case of direct acquisition) land owner. The 
decision-making power of the manager, whether the land owner or not, is limited as 
becoming part of the company’s strategy. The company takes over the agricultural 
venture, is in charge of the inputs, guarantees the sale price through the acquisition of 
positions on the futures market, etc. Adjoining activities, such as input provision, 
technical expertise, marketing, etc., are provided by the company itself, as part of its 
vertically integrated structure. During the production cycle, the company monitors 
closely the operations. Engineers are sent out, operations are overseen through satellite 
systems and the production accounts are kept under close observation. After the harvest, 
the company is in charge of the marketing of the production over which it retains sole 
ownership. Once the production is sold, the management company reimburses the loan 
granted by a financial institution (Figure 3). 
 
Within the framework of this model, the financial relationships are restructured or may 
even be non-existent for the producer/land owner. The relationship is between the bank 
and the associated company and is defined within the framework of a contract which 
stipulates that the intermediate company is both the guarantor of the seasonal loan and the 
party responsible for the production. The bank supplies thus the necessary liquidities and 
multi-peril insurances not to the farmer/land owner but to the intermediary. 
 
The added-value of such a model compared to the previous model seems to be the 
agricultural specialisation of the management company and the proximity in the 
relationship between the latter and the main actors of the sector. The company makes its 
profit through its technologically advanced contribution to the agricultural operations, the 
economies of scale related to input purchases, insurances, etc. and through advanced risk 
management. As such, the relevant delegates the risks, price as well as production risks, 
to the intermediate company. This company in turn employs several risk management 
 instruments. Firstly, it uses agricultural futures markets (SAFEX as well as Chicago) to 
guarantee the sales price and covers production risks through natural risks insurances. 
Secondly, besides the selection of producers according to their experience, previous 
results and farm characteristics, the company - through its direct presence in the field - 
tends to reduce the risks related to the volume and to the quality of the production. 
Finally, these companies tend to follow a double strategy of diversification. On the one 
hand, as in the previous model, they contract with geographically dispersed farmers/land 
owners; on the other hand, they develop their activities within several agricultural sub-
sectors. If cereal production represents their primary target, they do not hesitate to 
commit to fresh produce production, biofuels or livestock. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The agricultural engineering model  
Source: Ducastel (2010). 
 
It is at this stage difficult to estimate the extent of this model. The best established 
agricultural engineering company in South Africa is Farmsecure – a company without 
previous experience in productive agricultural activities. Created in 2004 with the 
objective of engulfing small and medium-sized enterprises, it controls approximately 700 
farming entities in South Africa, representing about 8 % of the nation’s annual cereal 
production (on cit.). Other companies seem to structure and establish themselves rapidly. 
  
* Investments funds 
 
The South African farming sector has since 2008 furthermore been characterised by the 
proliferation of investment funds specifically dedicated to agriculture. The profile of 
these funds and the investors who contribute to them vary: commercial banks, 
institutional investors (pension funds), public actors (development agencies), etc. For the 
greater part, it concerns actors external to the sector. The management of these funds is 
generally entrusted to agricultural companies which have local experience and networks. 
 
According to the expectations of these investors (profitability, the funds’ cycle) and of 
their forecasts, these funds adopt various strategies. Not all target the same assets, nor 
adopt the same management of these assets. As such, certain funds specialise in land 
acquisition as, for example, Emvest and African/South African Agricultural Fund. In this 
case, these structures aim at acquiring, under purchase or long term lease agreement, 
farmlands with agricultural potential. Within this category of investment funds focused 
on land, one can distinguish those that undertake directly the production on these farms 
from those that are outsourcing it. The first category focuses on an increase in 
productivity, through the use of high technology in particular, and on a rise in food 
commodity prices. The second group that focuses on leasing out land to farmers who are 
in charge of its development and production, speculate on the rise in land prices, and thus 
on the rent they’ll receive. Two types of speculation thus support this dynamic: the one 
directly related to land prices, the other one related to agricultural commodity prices. 
 
Certain actors looking to invest in the agricultural sector consider the direct land 
acquisition strategy, with or without control over the production, as too risky. In that 
case, equity funds constitute an alternative. The objective of the latter is to acquire equity 
shares into an agricultural or agro-industrial company. The risk is limited as capital is not 
placed in less rigid and less socially sensitive assets such as land. The agricultural 
company receiving these funds enjoys significant capital inflows which enable it to 
develop its activities. Although this financing model is less costly for the receiving 
agricultural company, compared to the loan-based system, it cedes in turn part of its 
autonomy to the investor. 
 
As is the case with the funds dedicated to land acquisitions, these investment funds in 
shares lead to various strategies guided by the forecasts to which they adhere, and by the 
expectations of their investors in particular. For example, "fixed-term funds", those that 
have a life expectancy of between 10 to 15 years (although it may in some instances be 
shorter), guarantee high returns in the short-term to their customers. They favor initiatives 
and activities offering fast and high returns for a minimal investment. On the other hand, 
the funds with no closing date adopt strategies based on the longer (sometimes longest) 
term with guaranteed and regular returns. 
 
It has been observed that on-going investment funds presently tend towards a preference 
for shares within already profitable and competitive companies. The latter companies 
benefit from additional capital inflows to strengthen their position. As a result, the 
 increased and massive interventions of investment funds are strengthening the positions 
of already dominant actors in the agricultural sector, to the detriment of others. 
According to the amount of shares acquired, which allows for a majority or minority 
position, the investment fund will have different rights regarding the management of the 
company’s activities. Again, different strategies occur here. Zeder for example, in order 
to reduce risk and as t does not want to get involved in the production strategy and 
management, aims only at minority positions (between 20 and 34 % of the shares). On 
the contrary, Agri-Vie – an apparently more aggressive investor - tends to control all the 
activities of its subsidiaries by imposing its own management model (cf. Table 1). 
  
Table 1 : Examples of investment funds specialised in agricultural initiatives in South Africa 
Investment fund 
(date of 
establishment) 
Fond owner Origin of capital  Capitalisati
on amount 
Investment capital Activity 
area 
Emvest 
(2008) 
Emergent Asset 
Management (UK-
based investment 
fund, specialised in 
emergent markets) & 
Russel Stone Group 
(SA agro-business) 
  -Land acquisition with direct engagement in production, transformation and 
commercialisation 
-Several agricultural sub-sectors 
Southern 
Africa 
South African 
agricultural  fund 
& African 
Agricultural Fund 
(2010) 
Old mutual (SA 
financial institution) 
European and SA life 
insurance companies and 
pension funds  
R3 billion 
(Approx 300 
million 
Euros) 
Speculative land acquisition (no direct control over agricultural production) Southern 
Africa 
Zeder 
(2006) 
PSG (SA group 
dedicated to financial 
services) 
  -Minority position (between 20 et 34%) with agri-businesses 
-No direct implications regarding production but with managerial inference 
-Downstream and upstream activities 
South 
Africa 
Agri-Vie 
(2008) 
Sanlam (SA 
insurance company) 
Pension funds, Private 
foundations (Kellogs), Public 
institutions (Industrial 
Development Corporation) 
R700 
million (70 
million 
Euros) 
-Majority position in agri-businesses (cereals, livestock, horticulture…) 
-Direct control over production 
Priority given primary production 
Africa 
African 
Agricultural fund 
(2009) 
French development 
Agency (AFD) (?) 
AFD, AfDB, AGRA, IFAD, 
West African Dev Bank 
US$150 
million  
-Intégralité de la chaine de production agricole primary (production, 
transformation, infrastructures…) 
-Towards commercial agriculture (80% of capital) and family-based 
agriculture (20%) 
Africa 
TransFarm Africa 
(2011) 
NEPAD business 
foundation 
Private foundations (Hewlett) US$20 
million 
Strategy not developed yet Africa 
Fund of the Rand 
Merchant Bank 
(RMB – SA 
commercial bank) 
RMB Own funds   -Priority to transformation and commercialisation agri-businesses - Shares 
of minimum 25% 
-Land acquisition (30 000ha in SA) 
-Management and direct implications for the company’s activities 
-Cereal and sugar cane 
Africa 
Source: Ducastel (2010). 
 Public institutions such as national or international/inter-governmental development 
agencies, as well as foundations dedicated to development often form part of these 
investor groups. It thus often occurs that the same entity is simultaneously guided by a 
commercial as well as a development orientation, alluding to the increased confusion 
between the promotion of development and the promotion of private investment. 
 
The extent of these investments is unknown, especially since several funds were only 
recently established and have yet to develop their implementation strategy (as in the case 
of the TransFarm Africa fund). 
 
4. Reflections on agriculture and the farmer 
 
This description of the state of macro-actor engagement in South African agriculture, 
based on the investment and production models currently  being established, highlights 
several trends and brings to the fore a number of questions: 
 
* Financiarisation and corporisation of agriculture 
 
First of all, the models show that new actors are appearing on the South African 
agricultural scene. Indeed, originating from industrial or financial sectors, engaging as 
entrepreneurs, investors or even as pure speculators, the suppliers of capital seem more 
and more exogenous to the agricultural sector. Besides financing, these actors bring along 
renewed business logics, modes of actions and regulations, stemming from other sectors. 
As such, through the increased role of banks and investment funds, for example, a 
“financiarisation” of the sector is taking place which is redefining the borders of the 
agricultural sector. Related to the latter, the last couple of years have seen an 
unprecedented boom in agricultural speculation. Whereas speculation has in the past been 
limited to an internal and short-term phenomenon, it has been evolving towards long-
term strategies, led by actors external to the sector. As such, within the framework of the 
futures markets exchanges (SAFEX in South Africa), a decreasing number of contracts 
result in an effective delivery. This trend is similar to speculative mechanisms in other 
sectors, real estate in particular. 
 
The South African agricultural sector is currently also characterised by an 
industrialisation process, or rather a "corporisation" process (according to Reardon and 
Barrett (2000)). This dynamic is not related to mechanisation per se but rather to a 
transformation of the production structures and their interactions. Increasingly, the 
agricultural value-chain tends to be controlled by one dominant actor. The control over 
various segments along these chains is established either through direct acquisition, or 
through contractualisation of the actors. While in South Africa the dominant actors 
include banks and certain former cooperatives, elsewhere other models engaging 
different macro-actors are emerging (e.g. Uruguay (FAO, 2009)). The organisation of 
agricultural production tends towards a strongly integrated structure, comparable to 
industrial chains. 
 
 This dual process of – “financiarisation and corporisation” of the agricultural sector is 
leading to a new regime: The global agricultural sector is presently undergoing a 
profound restructuring. The agricultural exception, as debated upon the inclusion of the 
sector in the WTO negotiations, has been buried once and for all. New actors, carriers of 
references and outside experiences, have entered the sector. Their interactions and inputs 
have been altering the sector’s "traditional" modes of action, investment and production. 
As such, a new agricultural development paradigm has been emerging (De Janvry, 2009), 
manifesting itself both at the national and international levels. 
 
* Concentration and dualisation within the sector 
The evolution of the primary production segment seems to follow or getting integrated 
into downstream (fertilizers, seeds, inputs) as well as upstream (processing, marketing, 
etc.) tendencies, i.e. segments which are already characterised by a limited number of 
actors controlling these markets at national (Greenberg, 2010) or international (Reardon 
et al., 2009) level. Two groups of actors seem to benefit in particular from the agricultural 
restructuring. First of all, the financial actors become the regulators of the sector, by 
directly controlling an increasingly large portion of primary production and by imposing 
their model on producers. By integrating the entire value-chain and by centralising the 
information flows, they anticipate the evolution of these markets, in particular the prices 
and act as arbitrators of these markets3. The second group to benefit from the evolution of 
the production structures is the agricultural intermediaries. Indeed, the financial 
institutions which intend investing in the agricultural sector increasingly depend on the 
services of agricultural engineering and asset management companies. As managers of 
both the field operations as well as the financial transactions, these companies are 
capturing an increasingly large portion of the margins generated by the agricultural 
activity. 
 
This dual process of – “financiarisation and corporisation” of the agricultural sector is 
leading to a new regime which is characterised by the dominion of a few large 
(international) food-business groups (Huggins, 2011) and could lead to the 
marginalisation of the majority of African farmers due to biased power relations and 
confrontation with models of significantly higher productivity (Losch et al., 2010). In 
South Africa, these evolutions tend to strengthen the dualism within the agricultural 
sector. Whereas the macro-actors of the food-processing industry see their dominant 
positions strengthened, entire fractions of the (rural) South African society are excluded 
from these dynamics. On one hand, the smaller and medium size farms (including South 
Africa’s traditional commercial farmers, the bigger ones being able to sustain by 
themselves) are being swallowed by corporates; on the other hand, family farming and in 
particular the small-scale farmers are stagnating in inert sub-sectors. Both parties have 
diverse financial, social and cultural resources leading to biased relationships (Borras et 
al., 2008), which seem to extend beyond the traditional cleavages within the South 
African agricultural sector. 
 
* Speculation and foreign powers 
                                                 
3 ABSA Bank is the « cleaning house » on SAFEX. 
  
The category of investors is foreign to the traditional farming sector: it concerns, between 
others, financial actors, commercial banks and investment funds, aiming to diversify their 
portfolios. As a result of the widely held predictions, they perceive the agricultural sector 
as an investment for the future. 
 
As such, the control of agricultural production by a small number of macro-actors, 
representing in many cases foreign capital, raises not only the problem of concentration 
and dualisation of the sector, it also draws the attention to the need to analyse this 
phenomenon within the framework of the strategies of these actors. Indeed, the strong 
volatility of agricultural prices, strengthened by the removal of stabilisation mechanisms 
in the context of market regulation, facilitates economic agents’ direct involvement and 
control over agricultural regulation mechanisms. On one hand, speculation strengthens 
profit-oriented strategies, to the detriment of food safety concerns in the countries where 
the effective production takes place. On the other hand, as foreign economic powers 
control an increasingly large part of the production, it also emphasises food sovereignty 
issues within these countries in a context of amplified liberalisation. Producing countries’ 
food safety and sovereignty are thus at stake. 
 
Indeed, as noted by the special Rapporteur on the right to food (De Schutter, 2010), a 
significant part of the volatility and the rise in prices can be explained by the emergence 
of speculation and an essential role is attributed to the participation of powerful 
institutional investors (investment funds, pension funds, commercial banks, etc.). These 
entities are often foreign owned with limited or no interest in the objectives of 
stabilisation, food safety and food sovereignty (Oakland Institute, 2011)4. While the price 
volatility of agricultural commodities and the strategies of speculation raise problems 
related to the implementation of development programs, they also emphasise questions 
regarding the regulation of the agricultural and financial sectors and regulatory 
frameworks in a large number of domains including the functioning of the futures 
markets and foreign trade. It also leads to consideration related to national policies, the 
development of sector-based and financial strategies and regional integration. 
 
* Proletarisation of the agricultural society 
While the emergence of these new production models generates numerous economic 
related transformations, the social impact should also be highlighted. Indeed, one of the 
common characteristics of these innovations seems to be the significant change in the 
statuses of the farmers. 
 
The incorporation process of family-based producers by macro-actors and corporates 
impacts their relationships with the sector. Framers find themselves incorporated into 
production chains in which they are isolated actors with no decision-making or 
orientation power. Generally, the technical capital used, characterised by ever-increasing 
costs, does not belong to them but is made available, owned and managed by the 
management company. Although in some cases they remain the owners of the land, their 
                                                 
4 Also see: “US Universities in Africa ‘land grab’”, Guardian UK, 8/6/2011. 
 situation is increasingly similar to that of proletarian agricultural employees, service 
providers or even just rent-seekers. 
 
These transformations not only impact the producer as economic agent, but in particular 
also as social actor. This "corporisation" perturbs social relationships and traditional 
features characterising South Africa’s agricultural and rural environments. The family 
unit constituted until now the basic structure around which agricultural production was 
organised, both in the former-homelands as well as on the commercial farms. The 
incorporation of autonomous family enterprises into corporate structures necessarily 
modifies the relationships with the agricultural sector. Is it the end of the family farmer? 
 
5. Conclusion 
The South African farming sector is presently undergoing important restructurings, 
related to the “financiarisation” and "corporisation" of agriculture. Linked to the 
evolution of farm financing and investment instruments, the present tendency is 
characterised by an advanced engagement of corporates, willing to finance agriculture in 
return of ownership of the latter by integrating primary production into their portfolios. In 
comparison to other finance instruments (loans, contract farming, …), these 
transformations seem to represent a new “tipping-point” in the country’s agrarian 
structure, characterized by the concentration of agricultural activities in the hands of a 
few traditionally non-agricultural macro-actors. In parallel, these transformations imply 
an "agricultural proletarisation" process, transforming family farmers into rent-seekers 
and/or service providers even on their own lands.  
 
In the absence of alternative successful investment and production models, agricultural 
development centered around macro-actors has become the reigning paradigm. It is, 
presently, being supported by the South African government, through diverse strategic 
partnerships, as a response to the many failing land reform projects. Also, the model 
appears to be spreading across the continent. It has, indeed, been adopted by the public 
development agencies (NEPAD5, AFDB6, etc.) and exported by these macro-actors 
within the framework of their economic expansion. As such, they tend to import their 
models and their vision of agricultural development. 
 
These transformations lie at the foundation of the present agricultural development 
tensions: the debate between family agriculture and corporate operations, the opposition 
between speculative investment and food security and the questions related to the 
promotion of foreign investment and food sovereignty (Bosc and Losch, 2002). They 
particularly underline the lack of reflections and debates around the implications of these 
transformations regarding national and international development policies and 
trajectories, whether agricultural or not, for these developing and emerging countries in 
search of alternatives. 
 
 
                                                 
5 New Economic Partnership for African Development.  
6 African Development Bank.  
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